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Abstract  
The importance of information security in software development projects is long recognised, with many 
comprehensive standards and procedures in use to provide assurance of information security. The agile 
development paradigm conflicts with traditional security assurance by emphasising the delivery of func-
tional requirements and a reduction in structured and linear development styles. Through a series of 
thirteen qualitative interviews, this study identifies practices that address this problem which have been 
successfully adopted by agile practitioners. The findings present four categories of practices – organi-
sational, team, project, and technical – and twelve critical success factors that should be explicitly con-
sidered by practitioners to assure agile security. The critical success factors provide a foundation for 
practitioners to strategically identify and develop best practices to embed information security in agile 
development projects. The identified categories also highlight the importance of agile security practices 
centring around individuals and culture and contributes to the literature by providing a representation 
of agile security practices that encompasses a broad range of focal areas. 
Keywords: information security; agile development; critical success factors 
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1 Introduction 
Information systems (IS) are an increasingly centric component of an organisation’s operational capa-
bilities and competitive advantage (Chen et al., 2010; Peppard and Ward, 2004). However, as organisa-
tions become increasingly dependent upon these systems to create and sustain business value, a critical 
system failure or a compromise of sensitive business data holds significant organisational risk and con-
sequences (Acar et al., 2017). The importance of information security and the potentially severe reper-
cussions of an incident is evidenced in many recent cases. In 2018, the Baltimore emergency dispatch 
centre was rendered inoperable for 17 hours after succumbing to a ransomware attack (Rector, 2018), 
while in 2017, Equifax was involved in the unauthorised release of 146 million customers’ personal 
data, after a third-party exploited a vulnerability in their systems (Bernard and Cowley, 2017). To con-
tribute to comprehensive information security and mitigate the risk of such breaches, development teams 
need to adhere to rigid industry standards and structured processes (Sindre and Opdahl, 2005). 
In response to shortfalls in traditional development methodologies, organisations and development 
teams are increasingly adopting the agile paradigm (Kropp et al., 2018; Licorish et al., 2016). Agile 
software development (ASD) methodologies emphasise adaptation to shifting requirements through 
flexible work practices and the rapid delivery of functional value to clients (Beck et al., 2001; Dingsøyr 
and Dybå, 2010; VersionOne and CollabNet, 2017). As a non-functional requirement, information se-
curity (InfoSec) is not typically considered to be a fundamental source of value to a client, and as such, 
is often treated as a lower priority than functional requirements in ASD, consequently resulting in a 
technical debt for security (Boehm and Turner, 2005; Chung and do Prado Leite, 2009; Curtis et al., 
2012; Glinz, 2007). Furthermore, accepted industry standards for InfoSec mandate formal procedures 
that necessitate extensive documentation and rigorous testing. These approaches to assuring InfoSec 
contradict agile practices that are dependent on short iterations and rapid delivery of functionality 
(Bartsch, 2011; Hood, 2017). 
As the security threats that organisations are exposed to increase in complexity and number, the per-
ceived malalignment between ASD and InfoSec may leave information systems and organisations vul-
nerable to security threats, and at risk of both financial and reputational loss. Development cultures 
where InfoSec is considered an impediment to agile delivery and is at risk of being under-prioritised 
may be detrimental to the assurance of security in information systems. There is the need to identify 
new solutions for addressing InfoSec that better align with the values of the ASD paradigm to ensure 
that development teams can continue to effectively mitigate against the risk of a data breach or other 
InfoSec incidents while regularly delivering functional value to the client in a responsive manner. 
Existing academic literature has identified this tension between InfoSec and ASD, and has made forays 
into recommending solutions, including security-oriented agile methodologies and techniques for doc-
umenting and prioritising non-functional requirements pertaining to InfoSec (Boström et al., 2006; Pohl 
and Hof, 2015). However, the majority of existing literature is conceptual, with few studies performing 
empirical research to understand the current state of InfoSec integration with ASD. Those few studies 
that perform empirical research are typically narrow in focus and describe only a limited range of ap-
proaches employed in practice. 
To contribute towards closing the gap in existing literature, this research project investigates the current 
state of solutions for addressing InfoSec in ASD projects, identifying approaches used throughout the 
development lifecycle, and at different organisational levels. As the technical implementation of security 
counter-measures does not vary between ASD and traditional development methods, this study focuses 
primarily on project management and coordination practices for ensuring InfoSec. To achieve this re-
search goal, a series of semi-structured interviews and subsequent qualitative analysis was conducted; 
the following research questions provided the focus for the study, leading to the identification of a cat-
egorised set of critical success factors for enabling InfoSec in ASD: 
RQ1: What solutions have been discussed in academic research for ensuring that the security 
needs of an information system are addressed appropriately in ASD? 
Newton et al. / Information Security in Agile Development 
Twenty-Seventh European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS2019), Stockholm-Uppsala, Sweden. 3 
 
RQ2: What solutions have practitioners adopted to ensure that the security needs of an 
information system are addressed appropriately in ASD? 
RQ3: How do academic recommendations for addressing InfoSec needs in ASD differ 
from practice? 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a foundation for three concepts 
that underpin this research; InfoSec, ASD, and critical success factors (CSF). Section 3 outlines the 
methodological approaches we used for our study. Section 4 contains a review of the existing literature 
relating to ASD and security. Section 5 presents the findings of the empirical research work. Section 6 
discusses the implications, contributions, and limitations of this research. Section 7 draws a conclusion 
and outlines directions for further work. 
2 Conceptual Foundations 
This section provides an introduction to the three foundational concepts of this research. It describes the 
main concerns of InfoSec assurance, and what practices contemporary ASD entails. Critical success 
factors, a fundamental concept in our presented findings, are also defined and explained. 
2.1 Information Security 
Industry standards consider InfoSec to be concerned with the assurance of the confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of an organisation’s information assets (Andress, 2014; Bagiński and Rostański, 2011; 
Ellis, 2013; von Solms and van Niekerk, 2013). Unauthorised access to customers’ personal information 
and commercially sensitive data must be mitigated against, as well as ensuring that this data remains 
accurate and untampered (Andress, 2014). Information systems must be able to operate uninterrupted, 
providing essential services even under atypical or potentially malicious operating circumstances to en-
sure business continuity (McGraw, 2006). Failure to sufficiently mitigate against a security incident can 
hold significant repercussions for an organisation, including disruptions to operations, financial costs, 
legal consequences, and reputational harm (Bellovin, 2015; Dynes et al., 2008). 
The threat landscape faced by organisations is continually shifting as potential targets, attack vectors, 
and defence mechanisms evolve (Australian Computer Society, 2016), presenting a complex and varied 
risk landscape, necessitating a robust, yet adaptable, approach to addressing InfoSec during software 
development. Threats to an information system come in many forms, including malware, credential 
elevation, ransomware, digital vandalism, information leakage and obstruction of service (Choo, 2011; 
Collins, 2013; Kang et al., 2014).  
As a widely recognised non-functional requirement, industry certifications and standards such as ISO 
27001 or COBIT comprehensively address InfoSec (Höne and Eloff, 2002; Siponen, 2006; Siponen and 
Willison, 2009). These standards provide benchmarks for assessing the implementation of security mit-
igation techniques and provide frameworks for implementing InfoSec and benchmarks for assessing 
security risk mitigation, providing assurance that an organisation has taken reasonable precautions.  
2.2 ASD Principles 
ASD is not a methodology itself but rather is a set of guiding principles from which a multiplicity of 
methodologies have arisen (Elbanna and Sarker, 2016). The most commonly adopted of these method-
ologies is Scrum, though other popular methodologies include eXtreme Programming, Kanban, Lean, 
and hybrid approaches (Kropp et al., 2018; VersionOne and CollabNet, 2017). Each of these methodol-
ogies takes a different approach to development and project coordination yet share a commonality of 
adhering to the fundamental agile tenets. 
Since the initial publication of the Agile Manifesto (Beck et al., 2001), the paradigm has become widely 
adopted throughout the software development industry (Dingsøyr et al., 2012; Licorish et al., 2016; 
Lindvall et al., 2002; VersionOne and CollabNet, 2017), as it addresses many challenges encountered 
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in traditional ‘Waterfall’ style methodologies (Glass, 2001; Licorish et al., 2016; Petersen and Wohlin, 
2009). 
The agile paradigm proposes that the rapid delivery of functional value to a customer is essential to 
maintaining customer satisfaction (Beck et al., 2001). Delivering working software as early as possible 
provides the opportunity for project stakeholders to provide feedback on the product and allows for 
further refinement of customer requirements (Dingsøyr and Dybå, 2010; Dingsøyr et al., 2012; Petersen 
and Wohlin, 2009). By iteratively repeating this process with regular deliveries, the project team ‘builds 
up’ to a final product that is aligned with the stakeholder needs. To enable successful delivery in these 
conditions, open and regular communication through direct interactions within the team and stakehold-
ers is prioritised over extensive documentation (Beck et al., 2001; Dingsøyr et al., 2012; Glass, 2001). 
Teams should be comprised of motivated individuals, who together possess the full range of skills re-
quired for undertaking the project from conception to final delivery (Beck et al., 2001; Chau and Maurer, 
2004). Management should empower the team, providing the necessary resources and autonomy to make 
decisions and self-organise, rather than adhering to traditional organisational hierarchies (Beck et al., 
2001; Dingsøyr et al., 2012). 
2.3 Critical Success Factors 
CSFs are those areas of a business in which performance has a significant impact on an organisation’s 
ability to succeed in attaining objectives, thereby supporting the competitiveness of a business and suc-
cess of future endeavours (Leidecker and Bruno, 1984). Due to the importance of achieving highly in 
these areas, an organisation should provide specific and ongoing attention to ensure its capability of 
fulfilling these key performance areas (Boynton and Zmud, 1987).  
Several key characteristics of CSFs have been proposed, allowing for accurate identification of factors 
essential to achieving organisational goals and objectives (Freund, 1988). CSFs are not an outcome of a 
process but should instead be expressed as activities within the process where high-performance is es-
sential. Claiming that all activities and processes are critical detracts from the concept, by diminishing 
emphasis on those factors that are truly essential. CSFs do not exist within only a single hierarchical 
level of the organisation, but instead should be identified at organisational, unit, and functional levels, 
with each contributing to success in a different way. Finally, critical success factors are not specific to 
a single organisation but are generalisable to all organisations operating with a similar strategy in the 
same industry. Competitive advantage instead arises from each organisation’s unique ability to fulfil 
these factors in a manner that capitalises on internally available strengths and resources. 
3 Research Methodology 
This section describes the research methodology we employed in this project. First, a review of the 
existing literature pertaining to InfoSec in agile development was conducted in order to inform discus-
sion of alignments and disparities between the current body of knowledge and the state of practice as 
discovered through an empirical study (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The literature used for this review 
primarily consists of peer-reviewed journal articles and conference papers from the IS and computer 
science domains. This review followed the systematic literature review method outlined by Kitchenham 
(Kitchenham, 2004, 2007) and Siddaway (2014), with key concepts from the literature being categorised 
and recorded in a concept matrix (Webster and Watson, 2002). Key search terms were identified from 
the research questions and conceptual foundations, which were then used to conduct repeated searches 
through electronic databases for potentially relevant literature. The identified articles were then re-
viewed in more detail for relevance, with only articles published after 2001 being included, and that 
explicitly discussed both InfoSec and agile development. The 2001 cut-off was chosen as this was the 
year that the Agile Manifesto was initially published. Exceptions were made for articles published prior 
to 2001 that provided foundational knowledge on a concept, though more recent articles were favoured 
where possible. The literature must pertain to organisational InfoSec, with consumer security and ethics 
of privacy being considered outside of the research scope. Once relevant literature was assessed for 
Newton et al. / Information Security in Agile Development 
Twenty-Seventh European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS2019), Stockholm-Uppsala, Sweden. 5 
 
inclusion, the core concepts relating to InfoSec in agile development were categorised in a concept ma-
trix, allowing the identification of related concepts for discussion in the literature review. 
The authors used industry contacts to assist in identifying suitable participants. Thirteen individuals 
from eleven New Zealand-based organisations agreed to participate in this study through qualitative 
interviews (Table 1). The organisations ranged in size and maturity, from small start-up firms to multi-
national enterprises, with development teams working with both internal and external customers. Our 
sample therefore comprises a range of typical organisations. While all participants were experienced in 
working in an ASD context, they held a diverse set of positions, including security managers, lead de-
velopers, project managers, and chief technology officers. The variety of organisations and positions 
allowed for the identification of a broader range of approaches employed by practitioners than would 
have been possible with a more focused study. It was also noted that most participant organisations 
adopted an agile-traditional hybrid approach rather than a pure agile approach, explaining that pure agile 
is difficult to implement in practice. As such, some of the findings will also hold a degree of relevance 
to traditional development methodologies. 
ID Organisation Type Position Experience 
P01 eCommerce platform Head of Platform Development and Architecture 10-19 years 
P02 Education provider Architecture and Security Manager 20+ years 
P03 SaaS vendor Chief Technology Officer 20+ years 
P04 IT services Security Manager 20+ years 
P05 Financial Development Lead 20+ years 
P06 IT services Project Manager 20+ years 
P07 IT services Digital Technologies Business Manager 20+ years 
P08 Security software vendor Technical Product Manager 5-9 years 
P09 SaaS vendor Chief Technical Officer 10-19 years 
P10 Media DevOps Engineer 10-19 years 
P11 Media Senior DevOps Engineer 20+ years 
P12 SaaS vendor Security Architect 5-9 years 
P13 SaaS vendor Chief Information Security Officer 20+ years 
Table 1: Summary of Participants 
The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured format, with a protocol of prepared questions and 
discussion topics used to instigate and guide responses from the participants. Questions sought to un-
derstand key security concerns held by the participants and how ASD is adopted at their organisation, 
and then explored how security is addressed in all facets of an ASD project. Points of interest were 
followed up by the first author to provide a greater depth of understanding. The semi-structured approach 
allowed participants to openly discuss the topic area without confining them to a pre-defined set of 
questions, which is essential to an exploratory research project. The interview protocol was amended 
for each subsequent interview according to the role held by the participant and areas of inquiry identified 
from earlier interviews. Upon the completion of each interview, the audio-recording was transcribed 
and sent to the participant to provide the opportunity to check for accuracy and make clarifications. 
Theoretical saturation was considered to be attained as the later interviews did not result in the identifi-
cation of any new factors, and only served to provide additional examples of these in practice. 
The data analysis followed the guidelines for qualitative data coding described by Strauss and Corbin 
(1990), which outlines a three-stage process resulting in categories that describe the phenomenon at a 
high-level: open coding, axial coding, and theoretical coding. The authors worked inductively through 
the interview transcriptions line-by-line, identifying and extracting any valuable information, and then 
Newton et al. / Information Security in Agile Development 
Twenty-Seventh European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS2019), Stockholm-Uppsala, Sweden. 6 
 
assigning it a concise descriptor, or open code. Axial coding was then performed by forming connections 
between the identified open codes; connections may relate to context, actions, or consequences. Any 
open codes determined to be irrelevant to the core phenomenon being investigated were discarded at 
this point. The process of identifying related open codes and collating them together produced concepts; 
a mid-level representation of the research findings. In theoretical coding, these concepts were finally 
related back to the core phenomenon under investigation, and categories are identified that explain the 
phenomenon at a high-level, creating a resultant representation of categorised CSFs described in section 
4. 
4 InfoSec in ASD: Perspectives from the Literature 
This section provides a review of current literature pertaining to the inclusion of InfoSec considerations 
in ASD. Five focal areas are identified, for each area an overview of individual practices and solutions 
to addressing InfoSec is provided. The approaches identified here are later discussed in section 6 in 
relation to the current state of practice as discovered through empirical research and documented in 
section 5. 
4.1 Agile Methodologies 
Extreme Programming (XP), historically one of the more widely adopted agile methodologies, has in-
built provisions for enabling the security of an IS (VersionOne and APLN, 2007; Wells, 1999). These 
provisions centre primarily around testing procedures, with automated unit testing of code ensuring a 
fundamental level of security (Wells, 1997). XP states that when a bug or vulnerability is found, new 
automatic tests are written to identify the same bug if it were to reoccur. Until the code has been cor-
rected and retested, it cannot be released to the product. Academics have complemented these testing 
procedures with further adaptations to better integrate security-related needs in the project. Ge, Paige, 
Polack, and Brooke (2007) propose that specialised security training should be enforced for all project 
team members and stakeholders. They also recommend that the security architecture for a system should 
outline the relationship between system mechanisms and potential risks or vulnerabilities before devel-
opment begins. Complementary to this, Boström et al. (2006) provide seven planning stages that can be 
utilised to address security. These stages include identifying critical assets that are unique to the system, 
techniques for security requirements representation and negotiation, and defining coding standards that 
the development team should adhere to. 
As Scrum consistently has the highest adoption rate among agile teams, it has been the centre of security-
oriented enhancements in the literature. Azham, Ghani, and Ithnin (2011) propose a dedicated Security 
Master role, who is responsible for ensuring the prioritisation and implementation of a security backlog. 
The security backlog is a prioritised list of security requirements alongside the traditional product back-
log. The inclusion of a security analysis work spike early in each iteration, where the product backlog 
is updated with security requirements will sustain the visibility of security issues that must be addressed 
(Mougouei et al., 2013; Pohl and Hof, 2015). In alignment with the agile principle of work simplifica-
tion, Pohl and Hof (2015) discourage the over-engineering of security by understanding the acceptable 
risk level for each project, rather than trying to provide a complete protection to all systems that may 
not require it (Beck et al., 2001). Despite agile development being a proponent of cross-functional teams, 
it is essential that developers recognise when external specialisation is needed to address security and 
are empowered to access these resources. 
Microsoft has compiled and published an internal Security Development Lifecycle to provide best prac-
tices for assuring security in software development projects. Recognising the growing popularity of agile 
methodologies, Howard and Lipner (2006) provide recommendations for supplementing agile method-
ologies with practices from Microsoft’s Security Development Lifecycle. These suggestions include 
integrating security as a measure of user story completeness, keeping code simple and releasing in small 
iterations to reduce the likelihood of unidentified vulnerabilities, identifying critical security skills and 
focusing these towards areas of high importance, and continually collaborating both within the team and 
with the project customer. 
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4.2 Strategies and Relationships 
New IS strategies should be oriented to support agile security assurance, by promoting self-organisation, 
adaptability and flexibility of security development, both at a project and organisational level, as well 
as promoting innovation and improvement of an organisation’s security capabilities (Dove, 2010). Strat-
egies should be able to evolve with minimal resistance in order to respond to the ever-changing threat 
landscape (Dove, 2011). Compliance with such strategies and policies can be driven promoting aware-
ness of InfoSec concerns, providing developers with necessary skills, fostering a team culture about the 
importance of InfoSec compliance, and encouraging open discourse about security concerns (Bartsch, 
2011; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Keramati and Mirian-Hosseinabadi, 2008; Weir et al., 2017). Not only is it 
important to have developers engaged in the secure development of software, but stakeholders and cus-
tomers should also be involved (Bartsch, 2011). By regularly engaging in discourse with the customer 
throughout the project lifecycle, the project team can refine their understanding of the stakeholder’s 
security requirements, even when the customer does not explicitly know these themselves. 
4.3 Security Training 
While the importance of having all project team members trained in secure development is recognised 
(Azham et al., 2011; Bartsch, 2011; Singhal and Singhal, 2011), research has shown that this does not 
translate into practice, with few practitioners being offered formal training by employers (Aguda, 2016; 
Bartsch, 2011). For those practitioners who do receive training, this usually takes the form of informal 
training through experience working with senior developers or methods to increase awareness of secu-
rity concerns (Bartsch, 2011; Keramati and Mirian-Hosseinabadi, 2008). 
All members of an agile development team should receive training and education in identifying and 
eliminating security vulnerabilities (Howard and Lipner, 2006). Ge et al. (2007) extend this proposal by 
suggesting that project stakeholders should also receive security training that is tailored to their individ-
ual responsibilities. By ensuring a baseline understanding and awareness of security across all people 
involved in an IS project, it is possible to minimise the introduction of vulnerabilities at all stages of the 
development lifecycle. 
4.4 Requirements Management 
Requirements engineering processes in agile methodologies emphasise user-oriented processes under 
typical operating conditions (Beck et al., 2001; Ramesh et al., 2010). Security incidents are an instance 
of abnormal events and thus are poorly captured during requirements elicitation and documentation 
(Boehm and Turner, 2005; Ramesh et al., 2010). As accurate and relevant, yet easily understood and 
implemented requirements are recognised as critical to the success of a project, solutions to integrating 
security into agile requirements engineering have emerged (Hofmann and Lehner, 2001; Siponen et al., 
2005; Tappenden et al., 2006). 
Abuser stories provide an extension of the widely adopted user story technique, offering agile teams a 
familiar approach that represents non-functional security requirements. Abuser stories describe the ac-
tions taken by individuals during a security incident, typically written from the perspective of either a 
user or an attacker (Boström et al., 2006; Kongsli, 2006; Peeters, 2005; Singhal and Singhal, 2011; 
Tondel et al., 2008). Misuse cases describe the sequence of events that occur during a security incident, 
providing developers with a representation of the entire process, and allowing countermeasures to be 
developed that address vulnerabilities exploited throughout an incident (Baca and Carlsson, 2011; Sin-
dre and Opdahl, 2005; Siponen et al., 2005; Tondel et al., 2008). Despite the above recommendations, 
Aguda (2016) found that few specialised security requirements engineering techniques are used in agile 
contexts. 
4.5 Security Testing 
While testing is a long-recognised method of assessing the security of an application, it traditionally 
occurs late in the development lifecycle (Boehm, 1988). Due to the iterative delivery of agile projects, 
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testing only towards the project conclusion is insufficient, and so practitioners conduct tests of the code 
on a regular basis using automated testing at all architectural layers (Baca and Carlsson, 2011; Tap-
penden et al., 2006; Wells, 1997). Regular automated testing allows early identification of vulnerabilities 
in the information system, so that these can be addressed and retested in subsequent iterations. Recom-
mendations also include the inclusion of penetration and acceptance testing methods in early iterations 
of the development lifecycle (Kongsli, 2006; Singhal and Singhal, 2011). By conducting extensive man-
ual tests early, major flaws in the code, architecture, and design of the system can be identified and 
resolved. 
During testing phases, misuse cases should be prioritised according to the importance of the requirement 
and tested in order of priority to ensure that critical security needs are resolved first (Siponen et al., 
2007, 2005). Further, it is recommended that simple and automated testing be used, as traditional testing 
approaches such as red team, penetration, and fuzzing are costly and time-consuming processes to con-
duct at each development iteration (Baca and Carlsson, 2011; Lipner, 2010; Tappenden et al., 2006). 
Berg and Ambler (2006) raise concerns that as security testing assesses negative requirements, there are 
too many possibilities that must be considered for comprehensive coverage. Instead, testers should ran-
domly test a selection of inputs that provide sufficient, but not complete, testing coverage. 
Despite the growing popularity of automated testing processes, Kongsli (2006) advises that manual test-
ing should still be employed under specific circumstances. Some misuse cases are too complex to be 
adequately automated, and automatic testing is limited in its comprehensiveness compared to manual 
testing. Nassiri et al. (2012) argue that automated testing can be enhanced to manage complexity by 
testing each component of a system individually and then testing again as an integrated whole. 
5 Critical Success Factors for Agile Security  
The qualitative data analysis revealed twelve concepts as critical success factors across four categories: 
organisational practices, team practices, project practices, and technical practices (Figure 1). Each cate-
gory details a set of related practices or solutions employed by practitioners to effectively address In-
foSec during agile development projects. The four categories group the twelve concepts according to 
the level of granularity of the practices and the organisational level they are employed at. Promoting the 
importance of InfoSec and employing specific practices to address security in each of these four organ-
izational areas fosters the delivery of InfoSec in a product. Each of the twelve concepts is representative 
of a critical success factor; activities or processes fundamentally involved in the delivery of secure in-
formation systems. For each of the twelve concepts, there are a multiplicity of practices and solutions 
that facilitate InfoSec assurance in the context of ASD. The specifics of these practices will vary from 
organisation to organisation, depending upon the culture, business model, and innumerable other factors. 
In the remainder of this section, we describe each concept. Whenever we refer to specific interviews, 
we refer to them by their participant ID in Table 1 in brackets (e.g., P01). 
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Figure 1: Categorised set of Agile Security CSFs 
5.1 Organisational Practices 
The organisational practices category encompasses solutions applied at an organisation-wide level. 
These practices impact all employees involved in the delivery of an IS and may extend to impact em-
ployees who are not directly involved in software delivery. Such people include organisational manage-
ment, who are in the position to influence software development, even if indirectly, and other business 
units that may interact with software development teams. The following three concepts were identified 
as CSFs on the organisational level: 
Information Security Strategy. An organisation should uphold strategic-level standards and expecta-
tions that apply across all teams and projects in order to enforce a general level of security that is deemed 
appropriate by senior leadership. Where possible, organisations should adapt industry standards to suit 
their internal characteristics, rather than trying to strictly adhere to a generalised process or rule set (P02, 
P09, P12). New best practices are also identified from conferences (P08) and more informally through 
the experience of staff and the organisation. 
Security Awareness and Attitudes. The standards and expectations should be reflected in an adequate 
individual security awareness and attitude on the managerial and the developer level. Responsibility for 
security starts at the top, with senior leadership and executive board members having a vested interest 
in security, and an appreciation for the implications of security risks (P01, P09, P12). Individuals with 
the autonomy to make security-related decisions and recommendations, raise concerns, and take action 
where appropriate, will contribute significantly to the embedded security of the product (P03, P07, P09, 
P11, P10, P13). Formal processes such as peer reviews and explicit security requirements could even be 
supplanted by trust in staff that they will code defensively and know through experience where security 
issues may lie (P03, P04, P05, P09). The awareness and attitude should also extend to a collective level 
so that team members are being notified of any arising security concerns and acknowledging the im-
portance of InfoSec to work being undertaken (P02, P03, P05, P06, P08, P11). This attitude towards 
security should be shared within and across teams to encourage team members to consider security in 
all of their tasks (P07, P10, P11, P13). 
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“…every single person is different, and then when you connect say, four team members together, 
and it’s what, four to the power of four interactions, and there’s a limit you just can’t go past. 
So, you have to start with that, ‘how do I make that person want to care about these things?’.” 
- P11, Senior DevOps Engineer 
Business Security Processes. As security is impacted by many units and teams within an organisation, 
processes that dictate and support these interactions are observed, especially in larger organisations. 
Among these are formal approval processes executed by a ‘security council’ (P01), internal consulting 
processes in a security-related community of practice (P07), or institutionalised re-use of past experi-
ences through a repository of known issues and effective solutions (P12). 
5.2 Team Practices 
Team practices are those that relate to project teams responsible for software delivery and the individuals 
that comprise these teams. Practices in this category are specific to each team rather than being specific 
to the project being undertaken and may vary from team to team within a single organisation. Agile 
teams use their autonomy to determine approaches that are best suited to their dynamic. The following 
three concepts were identified as CSFs on the team level: 
Composition and Competencies. Many participants identified a baseline level of security skills and 
awareness within agile teams to be essential to embedding security into a product. Some organisations 
(P01, P13) found that having a baseline level of security skills across all team members is sufficient to 
address their security needs, while other organisations with more extensive security needs complement 
teams with security specialists (P06). For small organisations, it may not be possible to source scarce 
security specialists. To address this issue, one participant identified the use of a ‘bug bounty’ program 
(P09), allowing the organisation to access freelance security skills to identify vulnerabilities that can 
then be resolved through internal baseline skills. 
Security Training. The security skill level of agile team members will not always be sufficient to ad-
dress security needs. In such situations, organisations often offer training programs or other opportuni-
ties to encourage the enhancement of developer skill sets. These opportunities range from relatively 
informal offerings such as mentoring (P09) or experience sharing through storytelling to more formal 
approaches such as ‘hack-days’ (P13, see quote below) or group-led seminars relating to specific secu-
rity techniques and online videos to provide annual refreshers on industry standards (P01, P08).  
“We go through examples of insecure development practices, and how they can avoid that. The 
best thing is that those examples are using our own application, so we create versions for the 
dev [sic] training that contain development mistakes that affect security…” - P13, Chief Infor-
mation Security Officer 
Recognising the importance of the customer in agile projects, one participant (P04) noted that providing 
security training to product owners was essential to being able to understand the security needs of the 
customer accurately. 
Communication. Participants frequently reported that InfoSec is not a regular discussion topic at the 
daily stand-ups, instead only being raised when a current user story has an explicit security requirement 
(P04, P07, P10, P13). Instead, less formal alternatives to communication are adopted by agile develop-
ment teams, both face-to-face and virtual through mailing lists (P08) or digital tools such as Slack (P01, 
P08, P12, P13), sometimes with dedicated security channels (P12). 
“We have a few Slack channels ranging from ‘do you need help with security?’… and the other 
is just a pure interest channel, anything security related, just to raise awareness and keep it 
light-hearted and fun.” - P12, Security Architect 
5.3 Project Practices 
This category includes practices that are employed at the level of individual projects and may vary de-
pending upon the characteristics of each project. The customer and the team will both be influential in 
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determining which practices should be employed in this category. Approaches taken here will set stand-
ards for how the security needs of the customer will be integrated into the lifecycle of an ASD project. 
The following three concepts were identified as CSFs on the project level: 
Project Security Planning. Participants commonly acknowledged that security cannot easily be ad-
dressed in an ad hoc manner; project teams must identify notable security risks as early as possible so 
that they can be given appropriate consideration and solutions can be identified. This process includes 
both initial risk identification at the outset of a project (P01, P02, P05, P08), and for each sprint or work 
iteration (P03). The teams should also have processes for determining the priority of newly arisen secu-
rity requirements or concerns and be able to adjust the planned workflow to address them (P09, P13). 
“In the planning phase we start to think, ‘how can people either abuse this on purpose, or mess 
it up by accident?’ And we need to address those things.” - P03, Chief Technology Officer 
Customer Involvement. Involving the customer was reported to be critical to achieving a satisfactory 
level of security, as they are ultimately responsible for determining what level of security risk is consid-
ered acceptable, and how much to spend on risk mitigation and countermeasures (P07, P08). Involving 
the customer both early and continually in discussions pertaining to security and clarifying security 
expectations in planning documentation helps ensure that the system successfully meets the customer’s 
security needs (P02; P07). In some instances, they lack the expertise to understand their security needs 
fully. In such cases, the project team must work closely with the customer to help develop their under-
standing of the associated risks and identify what countermeasures will be necessary (P04, P06, P07). 
“A typical customer will say they want the software to be secure. ‘Well, how secure do you want 
it to be?’… ‘We don’t know’. So, they’ll just write the contract to say be secure. We get that 
requirement upfront in the agile project and have to decompose it a bit.” - P04, Security Mgr. 
Security Requirements Management. Several techniques for ongoing management of security-related 
requirements have been adopted by practitioners, with many of these being adaptations of existing agile 
practices. Misuse cases and abuser stories were both identified as successful practices (P04, P12), where 
security requirements are written from the perspective of a user or an attacker. More common was the 
integration of security into regular user stories through a definition of done or completeness checklist 
(P03, P08, P09), or by relating the story to another document such as a security matrix or information 
flow diagram to identify how new functionality will relate to the security of the product (P07, P13). 
5.4 Technical Practices 
The most granular practices are those relating to the technical implementation of security in the focal 
product. These concepts describe techniques used to embed security into the deliverable itself and pro-
vide assurance that this has been performed to an acceptable standard. The following three concepts 
were identified as CSFs as technical practices: 
Secure Development Practices. Participants identified development practices that can be used to sup-
port the implementation of security into the product codebase, with many of these being derived from 
existing agile practices. Developers who collaborate tend to produce more secure code, which can be 
achieved through pair and mob-programming or peer code reviews (P01, P02, P04, P08, P11). These 
practices encourage developers to work in groups, providing a second perspective on security issues and 
acting as an instantaneous peer review of the code.  
“We try to do a mixture of peer-programming together; mobbing, where it’s more than two 
people for example. If it’s a singleton, so one person working on the code, instead of them just 
pushing it up the way of the people who review it, they’ll spend an hour with us just walking us 
through, so we can ask questions on the spot.” - P11, Senior DevOps Engineer 
Agile security can be further supported through the appropriate structuring of work. Keeping the amount 
of work completed in each pull-request to a minimum facilitates faster peer-reviews and reduces the 
likelihood of a vulnerability being undetected (P11). When a new security concern arises during the 
development of a deliverable, developers should attach the new security task as a sub-task of the primary 
deliverable. As agile promotes delivery of functional requirements, tying unexpected non-functional 
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requirements to a deliverable will ‘pull’ the security requirement through development, ensuring secu-
rity requirements are addressed (P12). 
Security Testing Practices. Before release, the security of deliverables should be validated. While this 
assurance is partially provided through peer reviews, formal testing is more comprehensive and rigorous. 
As testing is typically very process-oriented and time-consuming, participants identified the importance 
of ‘shifting security left’, i.e. conducting tests earlier to provide time to address any issues identified. 
Additionally, keeping testing processes simple and small reduces the impediment of testing to agility 
(P08, P12), achieved through automated testing tools which provide a baseline level of testing coverage 
(P03, P05, P08, P11). These automated testing tools may need to be supplemented by manual procedures 
for more complex security requirements (P12). Choosing critical areas to focus testing on rather than 
full system coverage will also aid in streamlining the security testing process.  
“We could do one hundred percent coverage, but that’s usually a waste of time because you’re 
almost certainly not testing the things that you really need to test.” - P11, Senior DevOps En-
gineer 
Penetration testing is a common practice for identifying vulnerabilities in an IS, though this is a costly 
and time-consuming process. Due to these constraints, participants suggest that penetration testing is 
only used at major milestones, such as before a critical deliverable (P04, P08). Acceptance tests typically 
assess whether a function performs its intended tasks (P04); inverting this test can validate if the function 
will continue to perform when abused, such as bad data input, thereby identifying potential vulnerabili-
ties without the need for developing a comprehensive testing security protocol from the ground up. 
Security Release Practices. Once the security of a deliverable has been verified in a staging environ-
ment, it can be released into production. The shift in environment and potential for vulnerabilities to be 
introduced into production necessitates further security assurances practices. Simplifying the process 
through automation and pattern identification for successful release of minor deliverables speeds up the 
release process while reducing the risk of operator-introduced errors, where an unexpected change in 
the architecture of production systems may introduce a new vulnerability (P01, P03, P08, P11). Different 
approaches to release deadline conflicts arising from security issues were observed. Some organisations 
operate a continuous integration/continuous deployment model, with no scheduled releases, in which 
security concerns can be comprehensively addressed without delaying a release (P10). For teams with a 
fixed release schedule, a choice must be made to either push-back the delivery date, or to release insecure 
code, with the former usually taking precedence (P10). 
6 Discussion 
Answering RQ2, our main theoretical contribution is a set of twelve categorised CSFs (Figure 1) for the 
assurance of InfoSec in an ASD context that is more comprehensive and grounded in actual practice 
than existing literature. These categorised CSFs provide a representation of agile security practices that 
encompasses a broad range of focus areas and highlight the importance of practices at a high level that 
enable individuals, engage management, and develop a positive attitude towards security. When we 
contrast our findings with the five focal themes we identified in the literature while addressing RQ1 
(agile methodologies, strategies and relationships, security training, requirements management, and se-
curity testing) to answer RQ3, we find that the existing literature focusses primarily on techniques and 
processes that can be used by teams to embed security into the development of an IS. Recommendations 
regarding strategy, culture, and people are generally high-level statements indicating the importance of 
these areas but provide few actionable recommendations. In contrast to this emphasis on techniques and 
processes, practitioners were observed to place heavy emphasis on the importance of people, their in-
teractions, and project coordination, rather than specific techniques, in alignment with the agile mani-
festo (Beck et al., 2001). We also expand upon previous suggestions of the importance of security train-
ing and awareness, by identifying specific approaches taken by practitioners to address these concerns, 
including informal mentorship and practical training sessions. 
Note that we were not able to identify any approaches employed in practice that fit into the first of the 
literature themes: agile methodologies. Practitioners do not appear to select agile methodologies on the 
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basis of their ability to address security concerns. Their choice of a methodology is primarily guided by 
the methodology’s fit in the team and organisational dynamic and its ability to facilitate rapid delivery 
of a quality outcome. The reasoning for these practices not being employed in practice is unclear, though 
this is perhaps attributable to either a lack of visibility of these proposed methodologies or being con-
sidered unsupportive of primary development goals. 
For the other four themes identified in the literature review that we could observe in the findings of this 
study, we found subtle variations in the specific solutions employed in practice when compared to aca-
demic recommendations. Recommendations in the literature including early and automated testing for 
security vulnerabilities and the use of abuser stories and misuse cases to represent security requirements 
were observed to be employed in practice. However, practices from the literature such as security back-
logs and early penetration testing were not identified by participants, indicating a gap between existing 
recommendations and the actual practice in ASD. 
Our identified CSFs also have practical implications. They provide a comprehensive foundation for 
teams and organisations to assess and further develop their internal best practices. We posit that by 
addressing these twelve CSFs through the use of appropriate practices, ASD teams can contribute to 
mitigating the risks involved in InfoSec assurance, while retaining benefits that arise from agile devel-
opment, such as rapid delivery, adaptability to change, and improved alignment with the customer’s 
requirements.  
However, our research is not without limitations. The geographic as well as the role diversity of partic-
ipants is restricted; all participants work in New Zealand, and many roles involved in agile development 
projects, such as product owners and Scrum masters, are not represented. A broader scope of participants 
may reveal that the practices identified in the literature that we did not find to be employed in practice 
were merely not observed due to the size of the data collected for this study. Additionally, the qualitative 
nature of this research and the use of semi-structured interviews for data collection and inductive coding 
for data analysis presents a further limitation. The information provided by participants is subject to 
cognitive bias introduced by their personal experiences, interests, and opinions. The role of the re-
searcher in analysing the collected data may also introduce bias through the interpretation of the data, 
despite following established guidelines for coding to reduce the risk of the researcher’s interpretation 
impacting the analysis.  
7 Conclusion  
We developed a set of twelve CSFs, which identifies activities and processes where organisations and 
teams must focus their efforts through strategically selected best practices to assure the embedment of 
InfoSec in ASD projects. These CSFs are categorised into four categories: organisational, team, project, 
and technical. While identified as imperative to reducing the InfoSec risk associated with software pro-
duced according to ASD principles, the application of these CSFs is flexible, allowing development 
teams to strategically identify and adopt security practices that are aligned with team and organisational 
dynamics and priorities. While these CSFs were developed with the intent of addressing tension between 
InfoSec and ASD, they may also be of value to traditional development models, though requiring dif-
ferent specific practices in order to be most effectively implemented. 
While these CSFs were identified inductively from data that reflects practice, they currently nevertheless 
remain conceptual. Future work should therefore attempt to validate these constructs, find relationships 
between them, and evidence for their effectiveness at assuring secure ASD. Future research can also 
expand the data collection further across organisations in different countries, of different sizes, maturity 
levels, industries, or business models. Subsequently, the presented CSFs can inform the development of 
recommendations that comprehensively address agile security concerns, by considering which critical 
success factors have underdeveloped recommendations and require further attention. Further research 
can also design and evaluate suitable metrics for the CSFs. This study also highlights the complexity of 
the tension between InfoSec and ASD, and identifies the need for further exploration into the nature of 
this tension and why it may not easily be resolved. 
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